HANS KUNG*

Science and the Problem of God

I am deeply grateful to Harvard Divinity School for having invited me again. I am happy to be back at Harvard.**

Why has God been rejected in modern times? Mainly for two reasons: First of all: God was invoked, and science opposed. Catholic apologists even today are inclined to make light of the condemnation of Galileo by the Roman authorities on faith, approved by Pope Urban VIII himself and carried out, in the Catholic universities, with all the resources of power at the disposal of inquisitors and nuncios. But this declaration was regarded in practice in Catholic theology as an infallible and irreformable decision and nipped in the bud the modest attempts of open-minded theologicians to think out afresh the biblical message in the light of Church, but also by the state, not only by Rome, but also by Lutheranism and Calvinism, when proceeding against scientists. On the one side, as on the other, censorship, visitation, prohibition of books, suppression of dissident opinions was the order of the day.

All the pressures of the teaching authorities poisoned relations between the Churches and theology, on the one hand, and the new philosophy and natural science, on the other, right up to the present time. And I think even "Humanae vitae" is a consequence of this development and of this attitude. It was claimed in these earlier days that it was a question

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*Professor Hans Kung is Director of the Institute for Ecumenical Research, University of Tubingen, Germany. This paper was read at Harvard University during Professor Kung's visit in 1980.

**I am here to speak about the Holy Father in Heaven! Because I think this is the main thing we have to do as theologians: to speak about God. God-talk: theology is precisely that. And indeed I think it is necessary for us to look at the problem of God here at the university where you have everything—the humanities, the social sciences, a school of theology, a school of law. We need to see [theology] in the context of the other disciplines.

That is the reason why I am speaking about this topic, "Science and the Problem of God." I do not understand "science" only in the narrow sense of natural science, but more as we do in German where "science" is the general word for all the different scholarly disciplines. But it also retains its specialized meaning of "natural science," and this is precisely the opening question and first part of my lecture. It is a fact that at our universities and in the intellectual world as a whole we have many agnostics and atheists. And I think every believer—and also every unbeliever—must ask this question: Why has God been rejected in modern times?

of defending the biblical faith in God, but in fact what was defended was the Graeco-medieval world-view. But over and above this it was a question also of defending the legally assured supremacy of theology in the hierarchy of the sciences, the authority of the Church in all questions of life and blind, obedient submission to the ecclesiastical doctrinal system. It is not surprising that since then the Catholic Church especially—but also other Churches—has been widely regarded as the enemy of science. Not even the Second Vatican Council in the present century ventured expressly to rehabilitate the unjustly condemned scientists, from Galileo to Teilhard de Chardin.

In the complex development toward modern secularization, this kind of belief in authority, in the Bible, in the Church—hostile to reason, philosophy and science—has very seriously discredited not only the Church, but also the Christian idea of God in modern times. The rejection of religion as a whole was always linked with rejection of the Church. This is true of the early rationalist critique of religion in the eighteenth century of the classical critique of religion in the nineteenth and at the beginning of the twentieth century and of the present-day critique of religion on the part of neo-marxism or critical rationalism. The history of the neo-positivist Vienna circle around Moritz Schlick and Rudolf Carnap—many of them of Jewish descendence—and also the origins of Sigmund Freud's work—both streams of thought had considerable influence in America—show how much the hostility of Church and theology to reason and science contributed to both the radically anti-metaphysical attitude of the then rising analytical philosophy and the radically anti-religious attitude of psycho-analysis at the same time.

It is not an exaggeration to describe the history of the relation between theology and science as the history of a continual defensive action, of a continual retreat, on the part of theology. This may be illustrated schematically by the example of cosmology. There was a time when God was regarded as directly responsible for whatever could not be otherwise explained: weather and victory in battle, sickness and healing, happiness and unhappiness, were explained as the result of his direct intervention. When everyday things came to be increasingly explicable by science, there had to be a retreat. God however remained necessary to direct the orbits of the planets. When it became possible to explain also these orbits by gravitation, there was a further retreat. God's intervention continued to be required at least to explain the still unexplained deviations in the planetary orbits (even the great Isaac Newton accepted this). When the "Newton of France," Pierre Simon Laplace, produced a scientific explanation of the deviations and God appeared to be a superfluous hypothesis for the explanation of the existing universe, theologians concentrated on the question of the beginning of the world and—against Charles Darwin's theory of evolution—vehemently defended a literal interpretation

of the biblical accounts of creation. After that, from the theory of the direct creation of the whole world by God there was a withdrawal to the position that God directly created life and the human being, then today, the idea of any direct "supernatural" intervention of God in the evolution of the world and humanity has been abandoned.

It is obvious that a theology of this kind leaves God himself without any function. God seems no longer necessary either for the explanation of the world or for the conduct of life. In natural science at any rate God could not and might not play a part any longer, if scientific method was to remain neat and exact. For many it was thus clear, once and for all, that religion was not a scientific, but merely a private affair. And consequently for many, science replaced religion even in the private sphere.

2. We must come to the second aspect of this struggle. God was invoked and democracy opposed. The history of Europe up to the beginning of this century makes it abundantly clear that secular and spiritual rulers, throne and altar, provided mutual support for one another. Political and religious-denominational tutelage corresponded to one another and hence emancipation from the absolutist state meant also emancipation from the absolutist church, and vice-versa. The heretic was also at the same time an enemy of the state, and a political opponent was at the same time a heretic. Even in the field of politics a continual strategy of defense and withdrawal was practised. Was there anything that was not forbidden or condemned by the Churches in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: democracy, liberalism, socialism, freedom of opinion, freedom of the press, freedom of conscience, freedom of religion? The failure, especially but not only, of the Catholic Church to meet socio-political problems with more than pious intentions, almsgiving and individual works of charity, seriously discredited belief in God at an early stage. How greatly has the socio-ethical potential and sociological relevance of the message of Jesus Christ been neglected through the centuries. How much did the association of an individualized belief in God with princely absolutism and its unscrupulous power politics do to make this belief increasingly incredible to the rising bourgeoise? Belief in God was opposed, because it was used by princes ruling by God's grace as a means of preventing the diffusion of the "light of reason" and of liberty, equality and fraternity, and of keeping the people in tutelage and servitude.

After Churches and clergy had come to be the main support of the unsocial, corrupt and bankrupt ancien regime, the cry of the Jacobins, "priests to the lamp-posts," and the public deposition of God in Notre Dame in Paris were scarcely surprising. For the first time in world-history—in France, but later also in Germany and in Russia—atheism had become a political programme. This was a bourgeois-liberal atheism, soon to be followed—after the October revolution in Russia—by a proletarian-socialist atheism which developed into a power in world-politics

through the communist movement.

All this has to be our confiteor! This confession we have to make honestly and sincerely. Both political and scientific atheism provoke the following concerns:

1) In regard to political atheism: admitting that the truth of belief in God has to be proved in both individual and social practice, believers in God who do not live in a truly human, truly moral, truly social way, are certainly a strong argument against belief in God. In the sense political atheism is decidedly right. Even a message which is disregarded can still be good. It may also be admitted that the church, which exist to proclaim God, can by its theory and practice discredit belief in God. But at the same time it should be remembered that, when the churches are credible they can keep the question of God open for humanity.

2) Modern science, if it seeks to proceed in a way that is methodically irreproachable, must necessarily leave out God—who in fact cannot be empirically observed and analyzed like other objects. In this sense scientific atheism is decidedly right. But we may ask again if an open mindedness in principle toward reality must not be required of both natural scientists and those engaged the human science.

There is no science which has for its object all aspects of the world, of human life and action. Today physicists, biologists, doctors, psychologists, sociologists, are concerned with the analysis of data, facts, phenomena, operations, processes, energies, structures, developments. And rightly so. And the theologian likewise—perhaps, also the philosopher—now as formerly may rightly be concerned with questions of ultimate or primary interpretations, objectives, values, ideals, norms, decisions and attitudes.

We have expressly stated that the failure of theology and church in regard to the natural and human sciences had a great deal to do with the fact that both scientific and political atheism were able to gain acceptance in the eighteenth century with individual precursors. This happened in the nineteenth century with numerous educated people and in the twentieth finally with the great masses in East and West. Yet again we may ask if this failure can justify the modern natural conclusions as absolute; in becoming often a quasi-religious "Weltanschauung;" in negating the question of God without discussion; in largely replacing in practice belief in God with belief in science and progress. Here everywhere the principle holds which many philosophers and specialists in the natural and human sciences have meanwhile come to recognize: critical rationality, yes; ideological rationalism, no. Rationality may not—as in rationalism—be irrationally made absolute. There must be no intellectual pride. Nor of course may rationality—as in irrationalism—be piously or impiously passed over or sacrificed. There must be no intellectual sacrifice. Rationality must in fact be taken seriously as an element—but only

as an element—within the whole of reality.

Yet, precisely in the light of critical rationality, the question immediately and rightly arises: Can a modern, rationally thinking, scientifically trained person still believe in God? This is the opening question of our second part. Ever since Immanuel Kant's critique of the proofs of God most scientists have taken it has proved that pure reason is bond to the horizon of our visible, calculable experience in time and space. We cannot effect the transition from the "visible" to the "invisible" or reach the transcendent beyond time and space and beyond experience. Even someone who does not subscribe to Kant's critique of the proofs must admit that there is no purely rational demonstration of God's existence which is universally convincing. Proofs of God turn out in practice to be less than cogent. And it is not without reason that there is no single proof which is generally accepted even by believers.

I cannot treat the whole problematique of the proofs of God. I would only like to say the following: we must not judge too hastily. As far as proofs of God seek to prove something, I really agree with their critics that they mean nothing; but as far as they bring God into the discussion, they mean a great deal. As firm answers, they are inadequate and unconvincing, but as open questions they cannot be rejected. Their probative character is eliminated today, but not their content; and what matters today is precisely this unprovable content of the proofs of God. But in this state of the problem how are we to find a rational approach to God? In the face of the claim of the modern scientific mind, how can we be convincing today, if we cannot produce proofs.

At this point must we simply believe? But has belief then nothing to do with thought? Is not belief without thought unthoughtful, unconsidered, irresponsible faith? Is belief in God perhaps merely something for devout visionaries and certainly not for thinking people, for scientists? These objections are justified. Belief in God certainly is not to be proved, but neither is it merely to be asserted and invoked. It is to be verified and justified: verified by this reality and justified in the light of reason. Here the thinking person cannot allow himself or herself to be obstructed by any dogmatic prohibition of questioning: neither in the name of an unjustified faith nor in the name of an arrogant reason.

At the same time, however, what must be admitted from the outset is the conclusion that can easily be drawn from discussion with Feuerbach, Marx, (Nietzsche) and Freud, that a negative answer, a no to God is possible. Atheism cannot be rationally eliminated. This profoundly questionable reality which is given to us, all the suffering and misery of the world, of man and society, provide simple excuse at all times for saying that there is no God.

The other conclusion however can also be drawn from discussion with the great atheists, namely that a positive answer, a yes to God, is possi-

ble. If atheism cannot be rationally eliminated, neither can it be rationally established. Also atheism is as Kant himself likewise observed—unprovable. There is in fact no conclusive argument for the necessity of atheism. Reality—profoundly questionable as it is—and also all experience of trust, security, love, truth, meaning, gives us reason to say that there is a God. All this means that a yes or no to God involves a question, a challenge, a decision: A decision which must be justified in the light of reason, not a purely arbitrary decision. No decisionism!

It is regrettable that so many false battles have been fought in modern times between science and belief in God, between theology and atheism. No thinking person today can dispute the fact that the critique of religion by Feuerbach, Marx and Freud was largely justified. Feuerbach was absolutely right in thinking that religion—like all human faith, hope and love—contains an element of projection. But this is not to say by any means that Feuerbach proved that religion is merely a projection. It can also be a relationship to a wholly different reality. Marx too was absolutely right in suggesting that religion can be opium, a means of social appeasment and temporary consolation, of repression; and it often was such. It can be such, but need not be. It can also be the means of comprehensive enlightenment and social liberation. Freud too was absolutely right in maintaining that religion can be an illusion, an expression of psychological immaturity or even neurosis, of regression; and it often was such. But again it does not have to be such. It can also be the expression of personal identity and psychological maturity.

1. Thus both the strength and the weakness of the psychological argument for atheism are clearly seen. God is said to be a pure projection of humanity's wishes. Is God really a pure projection? It must certainly be admitted that belief in God can be psychologically explained. But the illusion of a simple choice between psychology or God does not exist in fact. From the psychological viewpoint, belief in God always displays the structure and substance of a projection and is always open to the suspicion of being merely a projection. But the fact that it is a projection by no means decides whether the object to which it is related exists or does not exist. A real God can always correspond to the wish for God. And why should I not be allowed to wish that death is not the end of everything, that my life has a meaning, that there is meaning in the history of humanity: in a word, that God exists?

2. Both the strength and the weakness of the often repeated argument, based on the philosophy of history, that religion has come to an end, are also clearly seen. The strength of the argument lies in the indisputable all-embracing secularization process of modern times. But does this in itself mean the end of religion? Does secularization as such mean religionless secularism? Can science replace faith? The latter has meanwhile been shown clearly to be an unsubstantiated extrapolation into the

future. Seriously as the problem in particular of both theoretical and practical nihilism must be taken even today, Nietzsche's prognosis of the death of God has turned out to be a wrong prognosis. On the contrary, we see:

a) Instead of the "abolition" of religion by atheistic humanist, as announced in Feuerbach's projection theory, there is now in many places a new humanism both theoretical and practical which is fostered by believers in God. The atheistic-humanistic belief in the goodness of human nature and in human progress on the other hand is itself now suspected of being a projection.

b) Instead of religion "withering away" with the advent of atheistic socialism, as proclaimed in Marx's opium theory, there is now a new religious awakening in many places, even in socialist countries. The atheistic-materialist belief in the rise of a socialist society on the other hand seems to countless people today to be itself a form of consolation serving vested interests: the revolution becoming the opium of the people.

c) Instead of atheistic science leading to a "breakdown" of religion, as prophesied in Freud's illusion theory, there is now a new understanding for ethics and religion. The atheistic-scientistic belief in the solution of all problems by rational science on the other hand itself now seems to many an illusion.

But you will ask: if there is no conclusive argument for a no to God, how can I come to say yes to God? An appeal to the Bible is always possible. But this is convincing for the most part only to someone who already believes in God. And how is it with the other person who does not already believe in God or no longer believes. In any case one consideration is fundamental: The fact that God is can be accepted, not on the basis of a proof, but only in a reasonable trust rooted of course in reality itself. That is to say, I can reasonably commit myself to and rely on the fact that the reality which we can see, hear, measure, weigh, calculate, manipulate, does not explain itself, is not the ultimate and primal reality. This reality of world and humanity is substantiated, sustained and embraced by a primal ground, primal support and primal purpose. Belief in God then is a matter of trust. The ambivalence of the whole reality of world and humanity forces a decision on us: we are expected to decide, without intellectual constraint, but also without rational proof. Belief in God is a venture which cannot be proved rationally from the outset and from outside, but whose reasonableness and meaningfulness dawn on the person from within in the very process of deciding against a meaninglessness, insignificance, nothingness of human life and history. Faith has reasons which reason itself does not know: it is a reasonable trust!

What difference does it make then if God does exist? I would like to bring out here in a series of propositions in responding to great modern thinkers, many of them Jews, what could be given a very much deeper

meaning in the light of a Judeo-Christian theology. If God exists, and I am confident that God does exist, then the basic question of Liebnitz, "Why is there something and not nothing?, would find an answer, as also would that of Heidegger about the "miracle of miracles". Also, a liberating, surpassing, transcending, of "one-dimensional man" into another dimension, would become—as Herbert Marcuse demands, but in a way fundamentally different from that of Marcuse—possible as a real alternative even now; the infinite yearning of the human being—who, according to Ernest Bloch, is restless, unfinished, never fulfilled and always setting out again on his way, making further demands, gaining more knowledge, seeking further, continually reaching out for what is different and new would have a meaning and would not finally be left empty. If God exists, then all the irrecusable suffering cannot be cancelled out by abstract arguments: the unhappiness, pain, age and the individual death, and also the menacing final stage of boredom in a totally managed world—all these things would in fact not be final, but could refer to what is wholly different. The yearning of Max Horheimer and countless other people for perfect justice, for absolute meaning and eternal truth, for a life without suffering, would not be unrealistic, but in the end open to infinite fulfilment.

Yes, if God exists—and I am confident that God does exists—then the signs and symbols of transcendence, then the demands for a new consciousness and a new definition of values, the question of the great whence and whither, the why and wherefore of man's life and world's history, would refer not to nothing, but to the most real reality.

All this can make clear that what is needed most today is not a scientifically or theologically substantiated dissociation, diastasis, of science and belief in God, but a new fruitful synthesis arising from mutual critical respect. Science always raises critical questions in regard to any kind of belief in God. But belief in God also always raises critical questions in regard to any kind of science.

If however God exists, how would he have to be conceived against the background of modern science? This is the basic question of our third part, which again could easily be elaborated in the light of a Judeo-Christian theology. First of all we must make some negative demarcations. God must not be thought of as a "supreme being" dwelling in a literal or spatial sense "above" the world, in a "higher world." God is not an (almighty) absolutist ruler, exercising unlimited power arbitrarily over the world and man. It is this naive, anthropomorphic idea of God as a supramundane being above the clouds in a physical heaven especially which has prevented scientists from reflecting seriously on the question of God.

But neither may God be conceived as an objectified, hypostasised "opposite", existing in a metaphysical sense "outside" the world in an extra-

mundane beyond, in a world "behind" our world. God is also not a kind of constitutionally ruling monarch, bound on his side by a constitution based on natural and moral law and largely withdrawn from the concrete life of world and humanity. This rationalistic-deistic idea of a God as an extramundane being beyond the stars, in the metaphysical heaven, can no longer be an impediment to raising the question of God for serious discussion even among scientists.

Theologians, from Spinoza, Hegel, Schelling to Teilhard de Chardin, Whitehead and Martin Buber have contributed (substantially) to the preparation of a new understanding of God and the world. We may now quite positively say: God certainly is not the world and the world is not God: but God is in this world and this world is in God. To think of God in this way presupposes, not any dualistic but, a uniform understanding of reality. God is not to be thought of merely as a part of reality, a (supreme) finite alongside finite things. Instead God must be thought of—to paraphrase it in some of the great classical formulas—as the infinite in the finite, the unconditioned in the conditioned, the absolute in the relative, transcendence in immanence. God then is the here and hereafter, all-embracing and all-permeating most real reality, in the heart of things, in human beings, in the history of humanity, in the cosmos. Hence, God is to be understood as the simultaneously close and distant, worldly and unworldly God. A God, who does not make freedom of man impossible, does not restrict it, does not play it down, but makes it possible, sustains and perfects it. And for that very reason we may trust that, as the one who sustains, supports, guides, he is always ahead of us in all life and action, but also in breakdown and failure.

All this means certainly that the question of the God of the ancient world-view is obsolete: God as a miracle-working helper in need, as a stop-gap, who is always invoked when we cannot go further with our human science and technology or cannot cope with our personal life. But the question of the God of the worldview is not obsolete: the God who, even for scientists, can be the answer to those fundamental questions which, even for then, cannot be brushed aside and which again point to the intrinsic reasonableness of belief in God, and to its very practical relevance.

Who are we? We are defective beings who are not what we might be. Expectant, hoping, yearning beings who are continually excelling ourselves. But why are we like this? What is the explanation for this strange pressure constantly to transcend ourselves? What explains it, not only practically, provisionally, but finally, definitively? Is there no answer to this? Or is the question even permissible? If God exists, then it can be understood at the deepest level why we are very finite defective beings and yet infinitely expectant, hoping, yearning beings.

Where do we come from? We can go back over the chain of causes,

finding one cause after another. But the series breaks down when we try to explain the whole. What then is the cause of all causes? Do we not at this point come up against nothingness? But what does nothingness explain—except precisely nothing? Or should we be content with matter or energy, ascribing to them divine attributes, eternity and omnipotence; or even with hydrogen, which really raises the question of the source? What is before the big band? Is there no answer to this? Or is the question even permissible? If God exists, then there is an absolutely fundamenental answer to the question of the origins of hydrogen energy and matter, to the question of where the world and humanity come from.

Where are we going? We can aim at one goal after another. But one goal after another is attained and we are still no nearer to giving meaning to the whole, to the totality of human life, to the totality of human history. What then is the goal of all goals? Is nothingness perhaps both beginning and end? But nothingness no more explains the end than it does the beginning. Is the end to be a totally technicized or radically revolutionized society? Are not both these possibilities today more questionable than ever? Is there no answer to this? Is the question even permissible? If God exists, then an answer may be attempted on a higher plane to the great question, where is the human being and where is humanity going? To what is human life and human history directed?

All this has consequences, especially for our universities. Are these most basic questions indirectly in regard to humanity merely the individual's private concern and not a matter supremely relevant to the public at large and therefore also indirectly political? Are we not allowed to speak publicly about all this in our universities outside the department of theology or religious studies? At a time of unparalleled elimination of taboos, is God to be the last taboo? The question of God is too important and too explosive to be left solely to theologians.

There was a time when it was thought at the university that only the jurist could speak of law, only the psychologist of the psychical, and only the sociologist of society. Meanwhile criticism of "one-track-specialization" and the requirement of interdisciplinarity have born fruit. Today we have become largely aware of the socio-political implications and interests, assumptions and consequences of each and every department, even linguistics, history of art, the time is coming when people will begin to be aware, not only of the sociopolitical, but also of the closely connected ethical-religious dimension of each and every department.

This is not to say anyone is to be permitted at any time to speak incompetently on any subject. But certainly in the department concerned, basic ethical-religious questions are not to be ignored or suppressed, but taken seriously and discussed if necessary between different departments. For instance, in astro-physics the question of the origin of the universe; in quantum mechanics or molecular biology, questions of chance and ne-

cessity; in jurisprudence questions of legality and morality; in economics the question of ethical motivations and objectives; in medicine the question of living and dying. And should we not then have the courage to admit when science has reached the end of its knowledge and planning, or when it has come up against questions of trusting faith?

Fortunately today relations between science and religion, and especially between natural science and religion, have perceptibly relaxed. Militant atheism has largely become obsolete. It is true that agnosticism is still widespread among scientists. Someone who is not against religion is not necessarily for it. But at a time when we are able to do more than we can be permitted to do, there is a growing awareness, not least on the part of the younger generation, of the fact that the serious problems of the human being, of society, and particularly of science and technology, of ambivalent progress and growth, raise questions which relate as never before to reality as a whole. What standards and norms are we to observe in the state and society; in medicine and genetics, in atom-physics and space-research? What priorities are to govern our decisions? For what should we spend more public money? From what standpoint should we organize our basic life? To what should we commit ourselves in practice? All these are questions of ethics, they are also questions of religion.

For, unless we are completely mistaken, the faith of an entire epoch is coming to an end today. What is waning is that modern faith which dates from the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution and which for many people has replaced belief in God: faith in an everlasting, unstoppable, eternal, immutable progress. Faith in the quasi-automatic progress of scientific knowledge, of technical realization and of industrial production; a faith which had been turned by the philosophers of history—Comte, Hegel, Marx—into a universal world view, into a conception of history, into a theory of society. This optimistic faith in the power of science, technology and industry continually to increase man's material prosperity. And security in state and society is the faith which replaced the faith in divine providence that is now coming to an end.

But we should not jump to conclusions. We have nothing against scientific, technologicaal, economic progress as such, which remains vitally important for large parts of humanity. What we oppose is a faith in progress, a faith which relies on eternal automatic progress, as people formerly relied on divine providence; a faith which does not orient progress to basic human values and thus does not control, correct or humanize it.

Yet we should not draw hasty conclusions. As is clear from the reactions especially of the younger generation, belief in God is by no means the only alternative to belief in progress. In the all-embracing crisis of meaning, of orientation, of norms, which is rendered more acute by an unsatisfying, now often pointless division of labour and by ruined leisure, a variety of escape routes is possible: flight to the total utopia of a social

order, supposedly free from conflict, from domination, from pressure to produce results; or activist rebellion and even terrorism; or flight into privacy and inwardness; into political resignation and nostalgia; even the "Great Refusal" or simply flight into easy characteristic adaptation without inner loyalty.

The modern democratic state cannot provide any final answer to the question of meaning if it is not to become itself totalitarian. And a political party, including people of different trends of thought and belief, cannot answer ultimate questions or preach ultimate truths; it cannot and will not demand or provide a uniform, "ultimate substantiation." Ultimate and primordial questions, answers, truths, substantiations, interpretations were and are the concern precisely of religion—unless the latter is to be replaced by a quasi-religion or other forms of substitutes for religion. Even a person who cannot answer these questions would not seriously deny the fact that people in one way or another, sooner or later, are going to be faced with them.

And it is a good thing that politicians and scientists in particular are becoming increasingly aware of the absence of meaning in our society. The question of meaning, raised by so many people and left unanswered, is recognized as a political issue of the highest importance.

Obviously there are no ideal religious solutions for present-day difficulties. The answer to the question of God is in no way an answer to all the urgent questions of the day. But the question of God has a deep indirect influence—so to speak—from below, from the ground on those questions, by bringing basic convictions, attitudes, and values to bear on them. Ought we not then, particularly at our universities, to respond to the present crisis by attempting to get to the bottom of political-ethical-religious questions affecting both the individual and society, to which students often respond with the greatest seriousness? Ought we not all together in all sections of science and in all departments to be continually wrestling anew with the basic question, the cui bonum, the why and wherefore also of the different sciences?

Finally, in recent times we have gone through many forms of atheism, experienced many types of agnosticism, tried many variations of nihilism, come across many kinds of blind faith in allegedly supreme values like nation, people, race, class, science, progress. People have always believed in some kind of "God"; if not in the true God, then in some kind of idol. Belief in God has been seen to reach the heights and the depths. But after so many crises surprisingly much has been cleared up. It is not necessary to be against belief in God just because we are for heliocentrism and evolution, democracy and science, a liberal outlook or for socialism. On the contrary, let us state this very clearly: We can be for true liberty, equality and fraternity, for humanity, liberality and social justice, for humane democracy and controlled scientific progress, mostly be-

cause we believe in God. A short time ago an English Nobel prize-winner, when asked if he believed in God, is said to have replied: "Of course not, I am a scientist." Our address today is sustained by the hope that a new age is dawning when the answer will be the very opposite: "Of course I do, I am a scientist."

We have tried as succinctly as possible to provide answers—unequivocal, but incomplete. They are meant to provoke a free, reasonably justified decision and perhaps also for many people the revision of a decision. For one thing is certain, that today, against the background of modern science, the question of God calls afresh for a decision—from unbelievers and believers. There is no question of going back, of going forward. And as we look ahead to the third millennium, we must think again about what we could not discuss but only suggest here, namely, that the God of philosophers and scientists and the God of the Bible need not be mutually exclusive, but could even be—admittedly in a new way—mutually inclusive. This of course would mean the appearence of the more godlike God: That God before whom modern man without having to give up his reason and science, could again "pray and offer sacrifice, again fall on his knees in awe, and sing and dance before him." A vision? A projection? An illusion? A suggestion? A hope—not more than this, but also not less.